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magic9mushroom's avatar

>I don’t understand the obsession with where equipment comes from, as opposed to who has use of how much good equipment, what exactly are we worried about, that the chips or other hardware themselves have backdoors?

I mean, maybe not *hardware*, though it's possible, but certainly firmware rootkits. "Steal the guy's computer, replace the hard disk with one running EvilOS" is one of the bog-standard tricks that makes state actors so much more effective cyberthreats than anyone else. Western diplomats, AIUI, chuck computers after they've been left out of sight in the PRC for any amount of time in case this was done, and I'm sure PRC diplomats do the same in the West.

Obviously, if you're getting the hardware *from* the bad guy, this becomes trivial; you're ensuring 100% that they have the opportunity to do this. If the PRC is in your threat model, step 1 is "don't buy anything with chips in it from Mainland China". The PRC is, legitimately, in their threat model. QED.

I notice I am confused that you're brushing this off. This is standard cybersecurity advice that *I've* heard, and I'm not exactly a cybersecurity expert or someone with the PRC in his threat model.

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Mike Lambert's avatar

I’m surprised we haven’t seen “we should sell China our fighter planes from Lockheed and Boeing, so they don’t develop their own fighter plane tech stack”, as a flip on why the market share argument isn’t broadly applicable in all domains, but also the reason why there’s a commitment to developing a separate stack regardless.

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