Question: In Ukraine, what is the destruction difference between the most devastating conventional weapon and a tactical nuclear weapon?
As the war began, I used to read a lot about thermobaric weapons having many of the same elements of destruction as nuclear weapons. But I am unsure whether Russia has used any.
My understanding is that Russia has very low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that effectively function a lot like high yield conventional bombs but have very limited blast radius. Huge difference in orders of magnitude.
The smallest nuclear weapon I know of is the m-29 davy crockett which has a yield of ~85 gigajoules or 20 tons of TNT. It weighs about 70 pounds though so it isn't a very small bomb.
for reference the MOAB has only 11 tons of TNT equivalent, so the Smallest nuclear bomb has a payload that is twice that of the Mother of All Bombs and the MOAB weighs 22.6 *thousand* pounds.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, I stocked up on high dose Iodine tablets. Probably the cheapest, easiest defensive measure you can take. A few other cheap measures are accumulating a good stock of N95 masks, and disposable rain ponchos, and a week or two worth of high energy density, non-perishable foods. Maybe some straw type water filters, and a change or two of cheap shoes. Very useful for minimizing your exposure/uptake of fallout in the event of a post-nuke evacuation scenario.
Further preparations start to get kind of bulky/disruptive, but these are the sorts of things you can just stuff in a bug out bag and forget about.
As I understand it, iodine tablets are only protective of your thyroid. Assuming there has been some level of nuclear exchange that resulted in enough radioactive fallout where your thyroid was at significant risk to be worth taking iodine.....are there not enough other risks that the total protective benefit of iodine is minimal? I know that iodine tablets are cheap and have essentially no side effects, so there isn't really a downside to having or taking them, but how much better off are you really?
Mostly, it's a cheap counter-agent for at least one component of the fallout. Sure, there are other components, but you'd really feel silly if you survived the war and died of thyroid cancer 10 years later because you didn't bother popping a cheap pill. It's worth noting that thyroid cancer was the only cancer that was seen at elevated levels after Chernobyl.
The disposable poncho and spare shoes, similarly, are a cheap way to shed any radioactive dust you might pick up on the way out, and the mask a cheap way to avoid inhaling it. Neither will particularly help against the iodine, though, as it has a fairly high vapor pressure, and could be absorbed through the lungs even if you wore a dust mask.
Together they're about the best protection short of a good radiation shelter, or being someplace else.
I am thinking the probability of someone (probably many someones) putting Putin out if he started seriously suggesting using nukes is really very high in pretty much any situation. Like, 95%+ high. The reason being that there very likely won't be a Russia to rule afterwards, and unless they beat the entire world they will all be tried as war criminals after nukes start flying. Compare that to "Hey West, uhm, Putin went nuts and wanted to throw nukes around, so we went ahead and killed him. Sorry about this whole thing, here's his head and we promise to be good now that the crazy dictator is gone." In that case there is a very good chance that the oligarchs get to keep being oligarchs, and even the heir apparent gets to keep his spot if he is the one handing over the head.
Granted, the west could totally screw that up and even convince the inner circle that even if they turn on Putin we are going to end all of them, and maybe we will. Still, with barely functional strategic behavior we should be able to keep that escape hatch open for them to do what we want.
Writing out "barely functional strategic behavior" with regards to the US does, however, make me think I might be over estimating our chances all of the sudden...
Obviously I would love for you to be correct about this and there is some chance we live in that world, but the whole system is designed to not allow that. Also, he has already kind of seriously suggested it...
Perhaps, although seriously to outsiders and serious to insiders might be two very different things. At least I hope there is a practical difference between press conference bloviation and “ok guys start warming up those silos”.
>> What we need is for it to be clear to other nuclear states that the United States will be deterred from attacking because the cost of their retaliatory strike is unacceptable.
We unfortunately really fail at that. Being a Russian American, I know a lot of Russians actually believe in US decapitating first strike, to then bring an ultimatum for Russia to surrender and 'take their resources'.
When you say Russia goes to war with NATO do you imagine a Ukraine scenario? Because I imagine they would "go to war" with NATO very differently, more hybrid, below art 5 threshold etc. Which I think changes your probabilities a bit.
Russian doctrine is quite explicit on the thinking that the US would find an excuse (Ukraine) to bring its troops to Europe and an excuse to invade Russia, rather than Russia invading NATO.
I would also be more scared of Russian use of tactical nukes in response to Fin/Swe membership in May/June, thereby very much agreeing that the escalation would occur in the first half of the year.
If Russia stays below article 5 threshold I don't see much chance of a major escalation in response to it, beyond the types of things that are already happening.
And I don't see much point in responding to Fin/Swe with a nuke? What's the thinking there? Who is it even used on?
My first point is about the probability of conventional war and NATO triggering article 5. I posit that Russia will avoid this to a greater extent than currently generally thought because they understand the relative power. I write currently because it seems that people take Russia's war with Ukraine as sign of increased willingness of war in general including NATO. I would therefore posit a probability of conventional war between 2 and 3% rather than 5%.
The Fin/Swe argument rests on Putin implying that the threat of Finland joining NATO is a similar threat as Ukraine. But without an army to respond with, what action will he take? One course of action would be a tactical nuke in western Ukraine in the hope of a "quick" capitulation, therefore allowing the army to instead threaten Finland. (NATO fighting Russia to the last Finn as Reuters quotes Putin) An alternative is a tactical nuke in for example an uninhabited part of Swe/Fin to show that they are willing to make the move. After which it would be difficult to foresee the consequences. Although I do put both of these probabilites quite low ~0.5%, I do not think they are non-existent.
Question: In Ukraine, what is the destruction difference between the most devastating conventional weapon and a tactical nuclear weapon?
As the war began, I used to read a lot about thermobaric weapons having many of the same elements of destruction as nuclear weapons. But I am unsure whether Russia has used any.
Any insight on this question?
My understanding is that Russia has very low-yield tactical nuclear weapons that effectively function a lot like high yield conventional bombs but have very limited blast radius. Huge difference in orders of magnitude.
Which has very limited blast radius? Nuclear or conventional?
Well, all conventional weapons, in context, but also the tactical nuclear weapons that were designed for battlefield use.
The smallest nuclear weapon I know of is the m-29 davy crockett which has a yield of ~85 gigajoules or 20 tons of TNT. It weighs about 70 pounds though so it isn't a very small bomb.
for reference the MOAB has only 11 tons of TNT equivalent, so the Smallest nuclear bomb has a payload that is twice that of the Mother of All Bombs and the MOAB weighs 22.6 *thousand* pounds.
When Russia invaded Ukraine, I stocked up on high dose Iodine tablets. Probably the cheapest, easiest defensive measure you can take. A few other cheap measures are accumulating a good stock of N95 masks, and disposable rain ponchos, and a week or two worth of high energy density, non-perishable foods. Maybe some straw type water filters, and a change or two of cheap shoes. Very useful for minimizing your exposure/uptake of fallout in the event of a post-nuke evacuation scenario.
Further preparations start to get kind of bulky/disruptive, but these are the sorts of things you can just stuff in a bug out bag and forget about.
Maybe you will have the answer to this then:
As I understand it, iodine tablets are only protective of your thyroid. Assuming there has been some level of nuclear exchange that resulted in enough radioactive fallout where your thyroid was at significant risk to be worth taking iodine.....are there not enough other risks that the total protective benefit of iodine is minimal? I know that iodine tablets are cheap and have essentially no side effects, so there isn't really a downside to having or taking them, but how much better off are you really?
Mostly, it's a cheap counter-agent for at least one component of the fallout. Sure, there are other components, but you'd really feel silly if you survived the war and died of thyroid cancer 10 years later because you didn't bother popping a cheap pill. It's worth noting that thyroid cancer was the only cancer that was seen at elevated levels after Chernobyl.
The disposable poncho and spare shoes, similarly, are a cheap way to shed any radioactive dust you might pick up on the way out, and the mask a cheap way to avoid inhaling it. Neither will particularly help against the iodine, though, as it has a fairly high vapor pressure, and could be absorbed through the lungs even if you wore a dust mask.
Together they're about the best protection short of a good radiation shelter, or being someplace else.
Very good article, thank you.
I am thinking the probability of someone (probably many someones) putting Putin out if he started seriously suggesting using nukes is really very high in pretty much any situation. Like, 95%+ high. The reason being that there very likely won't be a Russia to rule afterwards, and unless they beat the entire world they will all be tried as war criminals after nukes start flying. Compare that to "Hey West, uhm, Putin went nuts and wanted to throw nukes around, so we went ahead and killed him. Sorry about this whole thing, here's his head and we promise to be good now that the crazy dictator is gone." In that case there is a very good chance that the oligarchs get to keep being oligarchs, and even the heir apparent gets to keep his spot if he is the one handing over the head.
Granted, the west could totally screw that up and even convince the inner circle that even if they turn on Putin we are going to end all of them, and maybe we will. Still, with barely functional strategic behavior we should be able to keep that escape hatch open for them to do what we want.
Writing out "barely functional strategic behavior" with regards to the US does, however, make me think I might be over estimating our chances all of the sudden...
Obviously I would love for you to be correct about this and there is some chance we live in that world, but the whole system is designed to not allow that. Also, he has already kind of seriously suggested it...
Perhaps, although seriously to outsiders and serious to insiders might be two very different things. At least I hope there is a practical difference between press conference bloviation and “ok guys start warming up those silos”.
Who do "Schilling" and "Shilling" refer to? I thought maybe Schelling but I couldn't be sure! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Schelling
>> What we need is for it to be clear to other nuclear states that the United States will be deterred from attacking because the cost of their retaliatory strike is unacceptable.
We unfortunately really fail at that. Being a Russian American, I know a lot of Russians actually believe in US decapitating first strike, to then bring an ultimatum for Russia to surrender and 'take their resources'.
Fantastic, Zvi. Well done.
Interesting post thanks, a few quick points:
When you say Russia goes to war with NATO do you imagine a Ukraine scenario? Because I imagine they would "go to war" with NATO very differently, more hybrid, below art 5 threshold etc. Which I think changes your probabilities a bit.
Russian doctrine is quite explicit on the thinking that the US would find an excuse (Ukraine) to bring its troops to Europe and an excuse to invade Russia, rather than Russia invading NATO.
I would also be more scared of Russian use of tactical nukes in response to Fin/Swe membership in May/June, thereby very much agreeing that the escalation would occur in the first half of the year.
If Russia stays below article 5 threshold I don't see much chance of a major escalation in response to it, beyond the types of things that are already happening.
And I don't see much point in responding to Fin/Swe with a nuke? What's the thinking there? Who is it even used on?
Apologies I read your article quite late.
My first point is about the probability of conventional war and NATO triggering article 5. I posit that Russia will avoid this to a greater extent than currently generally thought because they understand the relative power. I write currently because it seems that people take Russia's war with Ukraine as sign of increased willingness of war in general including NATO. I would therefore posit a probability of conventional war between 2 and 3% rather than 5%.
The Fin/Swe argument rests on Putin implying that the threat of Finland joining NATO is a similar threat as Ukraine. But without an army to respond with, what action will he take? One course of action would be a tactical nuke in western Ukraine in the hope of a "quick" capitulation, therefore allowing the army to instead threaten Finland. (NATO fighting Russia to the last Finn as Reuters quotes Putin) An alternative is a tactical nuke in for example an uninhabited part of Swe/Fin to show that they are willing to make the move. After which it would be difficult to foresee the consequences. Although I do put both of these probabilites quite low ~0.5%, I do not think they are non-existent.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-finland-nato-putin-idUSKCN0ZH5IV